I. Basic Idea
． This paper presents a model of sequential innovation in which industry structure is endogenous and a standard of patentability determines the proportion of all inventions qualify for protection.
． The rate of innovation initially rises as this standard is raised from very low levels, but eventually falls as the standard is raised to very high levels. Hence, there is a unique patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation.
． This critical standard is more stringent for industries which innovate more rapidly. . q p u .
II.The Model

There are two cases:
Flow profits earned during patent race 1 q +
Innovation q+1 is:
The firm is:
The leader from race q 
III. Equilibrium
During the current race, challengers select the R&D intensity that maximizes expected current profit plus the expected present value of competing optimally in future races.
The stationary symmetric equilibrium of the game
In a stationary equilibrium where firms choose identical strategies, there is the following proposition: 
